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The Economic Resources Zone and
the Southwest Pacific
Although the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea has issues of
major importance to resolve, especially in relation to deep seabed mining,
there is increasing consensus on the regime that is to apply in the economic
resources zone of a coastal state and the terms of access of other nations to a
coastal state's economic zone. The relevant provisions are contained in the
Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea promulgated after the ninth session
of the conference' which is the end product of a series of earlier negotiating
texts. It is the purpose of this article, having regard to the negotiating stand
taken by the countries in the southwest Pacific at the conference, to analyze
whether the provisions contained in the Draft Convention can be regarded
as being in the economic and political interests of the region. Examination
will be made of the policies of Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, Western
Samoa, Fiji and other countries in the southwest Pacific. A common
approach was taken on many issues by these countries, but, if there were
differences, it was often Australia which took a different standpoint. These
differences will be pinpointed.
The main areas of concern during the conference in regard to the eco-
nomic zone have been the control and allocation of fisheries resources
within the zone; the problem of migratory species; the extent to which the
coastal state may take measures to control the marine environment and sci-
entific research; the question whether small, uninhabitated islands should
be able to claim economic zones of their own; and the relationship between
the economic zone and the continental shelf. Although these matters over-
lap to some extent it is convenient to deal with them individually.
*Mr. Phillips is a member of the law faculty at the University of Queensland.
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I. Fisheries
The fishing interests of the countries in the southwest Pacific from the
point of establishing a negotiating position at the conference were much
simpler than those of many other countries. For instance, Australia, the
largest and, perhaps, the most economically advanced of these countries
possesses no long-distance fishing fleets of any significance which harvest
outside the 200-mile limit. Within the limit foreign fleets (mainly the Japa-
nese) exploit blue-fin tuna, marlin and surf fish 2 to the southwest, and the
Taiwanese and, to a lesser extent, the Indonesians exploit the demersal
trawl fish to the north and west.3 It is clear that Australian interests would
be served by the introduction of an economic zone where the maximum
control of fisheries resources is exercised by the coastal state, including the
determination of the entry conditions for foreign ships to the zone. Such
control would enable foreign fishing fleets to be excluded from fisheries
exploited or likely to be exploited by Australian fishermen,4 and, at the
same time, foreign fishermen could be charged appropriate licensing fees
for access or be allowed to enter into joint venture arrangements with Aus-
tralian fishermen where it was thought appropriate. 5 The interests of the
other nations in the southwest Pacific, which have even smaller fishing fleets
and which (within their 200-mile limits) are subject to a degree of foreign
fishing, would also be served by such a regime.
In accordance with these objectives, Australia and New Zealand submit-
ted a working paper preparatory to the commencement of the Law of the
Sea Conference which proposed that, if the local fishing industry had the
capacity to fully exploit the stock within its zone, the coastal state could
exclude all foreign fleets, allocating 100 percent of the catch to local indus-
try.6 It would only be in cases in which the local industry had no such
capacity that there would be a duty to give access to other states, and on
terms and conditions that the coastal state might determine. This proposal
was in line with the attitudes of other nations in the south Pacific and,
2AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES COUNCIL, THE 200 MILE AUSTRALIAN FISHING ZONE, (1977) at
16-17. The Japanese blue-fin tuna catch is estimated to be between 50,000 and 60,000 tons.
The larger tuna may fetch $4,000 a ton on the Japanese raw meat market. (See Mr. Lionel
Bowen in the House of Representatives Weekly Hansard May 11, 1978. No. 8, at 2296.)
'Id. at 17.
'The fisheries already developed by Australian fishermen are: in-shore scale fisheries (mul-
let and whiting); juvenile southern Blue-fin tuna; southern, western and tropical rock lobsters;
south Australian, west Australian, northern and east coast prawns; Australian salmon; east
coast trawl fisheries. See AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 17-18.
'The demersal fish resources to the north and west are considered to be particularly suitable
for joint ventures as the potential harvest is considered to be beyond the capacity of Australian
fleets. See Liu, The demersalfish stocks ofthe waters ofnorth and south-west Australia, ACTA.
OCEAN. TAIWANIAN SCI. REPTS., NAT'L TAIWAN UNIVERSITY, at 128-134. Liu estimates the
potential harvest to be over 1 million tons annually. The present harvest is 70-80,000 tons per
year.
'U.N. Doc. A/Ac. 138 of Sc. I I/L. 11 (1972). This approach was apparent also from the
Australian government's spokesman during the second reading of the Fisheries Amendment
Bill, 1978, which established the Australian 200-mile fishing limit.
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indeed, the developing coastal states in general. For example, the represen-
tative of Western Samoa advocated "an exclusive fisheries jurisdiction...
because of the paramount importance of fisheries as the very livelihood of
the people of his country," where "the coastal state could offer a percentage
of the unutilized available catch to others on terms not unfavorable to it,
and would have residual rights to control the fish stocks."' 7 Similar senti-
ments were expressed by Tonga, 8 Indonesia 9 and Fiji.10
The views of the countries in the southwest Pacific were, on the other
hand, in direct conflict with the views of landlocked and geographically
disadvantaged states which envisaged that states in this category should
share in the resources of a coastal state having no prior claim at all to the
resources of the zone."I It was also at variance with those states possessing
long-distance fishing fleets which argued that "states that have normally
fished for a resource" should have prior claim to the resources of the zone
over everybody except the coastal state.' 2
To what extent do the provisions of the Draft Convention reflect the atti-
tudes of the southwest Pacific? There are provisions in the Draft Conven-
tion to allow for the participation of states other than the coastal state in the
fisheries resources of the zone. Special attention is given to participation by
landlocked countries or states with special geographical characteristics' 3 in
articles 69 and 70. The provisions of these articles give landlocked states
and states with special geographical characteristics "a right to participate,
on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the sur-
plus of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal states
of the same subregion or region, taking into account the relevant economic
and geographical circumstances of all states concerned."' 4 The "terms and
modalities" of such participation would be established by the states con-
cerned through bilateral, subregional or regional arrangements. If the
coastal state "approaches a point which would enable it to harvest the entire
'THIRD U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS [hereafter cited as
OFFICIAL RECORDS], Vol. 11, at 189. See also the views of Tanzania, supra, at 183, for the
general developing coastal state view.
'OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. II, at 190.
'OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. II, at 249.
'OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. I, at 113.
"See the proposal of Afghanistan, Austria, and Nepal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2 L. 39;
Bolivia and Paraguay, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 62/C 2/L. 65; Zambia, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 62/C.
2/L. 95.
2See the American proposal, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 49, article 13; and the position
of the U.S.S.R., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 38.
"States with special geographical characteristics are defined in art. 70(2) of the Draft Con-
vention. The definition reads: "States with special geographical characteristics means coastal
States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical situa-
tion makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive zones
of other States in the sub-region or region for the nutritional purposes of their populations or
parts thereof, and coastal States which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own."
See generally Phillips, Exclusive Economic Zone as a concept in International Law, 585 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 607 (1977), at n.90.
'Articles 69(1) and 70(1) of the Draft Convention.
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allowable catch" the coastal state shall cooperate for the participation of
developing landlocked countries and countries with special geographical
characteristics in the exploitation of the economic zones of states in the
same region or subregion "as may be appropriate in the circumstances and
on terms satisfactory to all parties."1 5 Developed, landlocked states and
states with special geographical characteristics can only participate in the
economic zones of developed coastal states, and only then in any surplus
fishing stocks. 16
What is immediately clear from these provisions is that the right of par-
ticipation is given in relation to the economic zones of coastal states in the
same region or subregion. No definition of "region" or "subregion" is pro-
vided, but the regional approach means that the states of the southwest
Pacific will be relatively unaffected by the provisions of these articles.
Singapore, a geographically disadvantaged state, is the only state which
might conceivably come within the "region." The regional approach to the
problems of landlocked countries and countries with special geographical
characteristics is open to criticism on the basis that the right of participation
is dependent merely on geographical accident, and some of the most devel-
oped countries will face no claims for participation-the United States, for
example, has no adjoining landlocked states, while Zaire has five. But it is
a policy which undoubtedly favors the states of the southwest Pacific.
In any event, it is plain that the provisions relating to access for these
countries would not undermine the right of the national government to
refuse access to fishing resources that the coastal state can harvest or its
discretion in allowing access to countries of its choosing. The right of
access to landlocked countries or countries with special geographical char-
acteristics is limited to participation in surplus resources before a coastal
state's harvesting capacity is "approaching a point which would enable it to
harvest the entire allowable catch." When this point has been reached no
definite right of participation is given to the landlocked states or states with
special geographical characteristics. It is true that it is stated that after such
a time the coastal state "shall cooperate"1 7 in the establishment of equitable
arrangements for the participation of these groups in all the resources of its
economic zone, but, in contrast to the provisions regarding surplus
resources, the words "right to participate" are omitted and the access must
be "on terms satisfactory to all parties." Even in relation to the participa-
tion of the landlocked countries and countries with special geographical
characteristics in the surplus living resources of the zone, there is to be no
equal right of participation but only "equitable" participation to be depen-
dent on the terms of the agreement reached. In coming to any agreement
for access the coastal state must also have regard to other matters, including
the needs of those countries whose nationals have habitually fished the
'"Articles 69(3) and 70(4) of the Draft Convention.
"Articles 69(4) and 70(5) of the Draft Convention.
"
7Articles 69(3) and 70(4) of the Draft Convention.
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area. 8 In sum, there is no obligation imposed by the Draft Convention on
the coastal state to give access to one category of state rather than another,
or to allow access to resources that the local industry can harvest.
Australia's legislation declaring a 200-mile fisheries zone reflects the view
that there should be no restraint on the government's choice as to which
states should have access. The Australian legislation assumes control over
all fishing resources within the 200-mile economic zone and authorizes the
minister responsible for the administration of the act to grant licenses on a
wide variety of terms and conditions, including payment of fees.' 9 This is
in accordance with the Draft Convention which authorizes the coastal state
to take such measures for the management of fishing resources in the
zone.20 Unlike the Draft Convention, no guidelines are given as to the cri-
teria the minister should take into account in granting access or suggesting
one category of countries should be favored rather than another. There is
merely a general requirement that the minister should have regard to the
objectives of optimum utilization of the living resources of the Australian
fishing zone and of ensuring that the living resources of the Australian
fishing zone are not endangered by over exploitation.
21
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji have adopted similar legisla-
tion except that these legislatives have stipulated the criteria to be applied
in granting access to foreign nationals. The thrust of these provisions is to
emphasize that the major determining factor for granting access is the bene-
fit that other nations have conferred upon the fisheries industries of those
countries in terms of research, identification of fishing stocks, the conserva-
tion and management of fishing resources, and the enforcement of domestic
law relating to such resources. 22 There is no mention of landlocked or geo-
graphically disadvantaged states, but that is because the participation of
these countries is postulated on a regional basis. The legislation of all these
countries does refer in the criteria for granting access to states that have
habitually fished the area, 23 and it cannot be argued, therefore, that it con-
flicts with the provisions of the Draft Convention. Even the formula
adopted by the Solomon Islands with a simple declaration that the "Solo-
mon Islands has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing, conserving and managing the natural resources [of the economic
"Articles 62(3) of the Draft Convention.
"Fisheries Amendment Act (1978) (C'wth) § 9, AUSTRL. C. ACTS, (1978); amending § 9 of
the Fisheries Act, AUSTL. C. ACTS, (1952). The Australian government has entered into com-
plex agreements with the Taiwanese and Japanese.
2 Article 62(4) of the Draft Convention.
" § 6, AUSTL. C. ACTS, (1978). Cf. Articles 62(1) and 61(2) of the Draft Convention.
2 New Zealand: Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act § 13, (1977). Fiji:
Marine Spaces Act § 11, (1977). Papua New Guinea: Fisheries (Declared Fisheries Zone) Act
1977 § 4, amending the Fisheries Act (1974).
"New Zealand: Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act § 13(2)(a) (1977). Fiji:
Marine Spaces Act § 1 l(4)(a). Papua New Guinea: Fisheries (Declared Fisheries Zone) Act
1977, § 4.
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zone]" 24 is not inconsistent with the Draft Convention's articles, given the
discretion vested by the convention in the coastal state to grant access and
to impose conditions on access.
II. Migratory Species
The nations of the southwest Pacific have a special interest in the provi-
sions relating to migratory species since Japanese long-distance fishing
fleets harvest southern blue-fin tuna within the various 200-mile zones.
Australia and New Zealand jointly proposed a draft article on migratory
species 25 at the early stages of the conference. It envisaged the formation of
an international organization to regulate the harvesting of a particular spe-
cies. The international institution was to allocate national quotas and in
doing so take into account the coastal state's right of priority over other
states to harvest the regulated species within its economic zone. 26 A fee
fixed in relation to the amount of catch was to be paid to the coastal state by
foreign fishermen within the economic zone. 27 This was a midway position
aimed at achieving a compromise between regulation on a purely interna-
tional basis, giving the coastal state no special rights when the species hap-
pened to be in that state's economic zone,28 and total control by the coastal
state when the migratory fish were within the economic zone of the coastal
state. 29 Most of the other states in the southwest Pacific would have pre-
ferred the latter approach with its emphasis on coastal state control.30 The
Draft Convention adopts a general, and nebulous, proposal regarding
migratory species in terms that "the coastal state and other states whose
nationals fish in the region for [highly migratory species] shall cooperate
directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view to
ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization
of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive
economic zone."' 3' The provision does not envisage the setting up of an
international organization, with the terms of reference and powers as advo-
cated in the Australian/New Zealand proposal. The result is that the con-
trol of migratory species is governed by the general articles of the Draft
Convention regarding the control of fisheries. Thus, as explained, access to
fish for migratory species in a coastal state's economic zone will be deter-
mined by the coastal state on conditions laid down by that state. In one
2 Delimitation of Marine Waters Act § 5, (1978).
2 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. III, at 231.
2 Id., article 4(a).
"Id., article 5(c).
"See the Working Paper submitted by the United States, Special Considerations Regarding
the management of anadromous andhighly migratory ocean fishes, " in III REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEA-BED AND OCEAN FLOOR, Supp. No. 21, at 11.
"See the Canadian proposal, id., at 82.
"See the views expressed at the conference, supra notes 7-10 (Western Samoa, Tonga, Indo-
nesia, Fiji).
"Article 64 of the Draft Convention.
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sense this is beneficial to all countries in the southwest area as it enables the
responsible minister to impose any conditions on a license to fish for migra-
tory species without reference to an outside body. But the deleterious effect
is to reduce international control of the exploitation of this resource outside
the 200-mile zone. This is significant as it has been estimated that the Japa-
nese may be able to achieve present levels of harvesting without fishing
within the various 200-mile zones in the area. In the southwest Pacific the
large number of island states means that six million square miles of ocean
will be brought under national control, and in order to provide some degree
of regional cooperation, the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency has
been established, one of the objects of which is to agree "on a common
basis for negotiations with distant water fishing interests in relation to high-
ly migratory species."'32 This will provide a degree of inter-governmental
planning and international cooperation that was encouraged and suggested
by the original Australian/New Zealand proposal.
III. Protection of the Marine Environment
A critical dispute at the Law of the Sea Conference was the extent to
which the coastal state should have the power to take measures for the pres-
ervation of the marine environment in the economic zone and to enforce
those provisions. The Draft Convention in Article 56(l)(b)(iii) gives the
coastal state a general jurisdiction with regard "to the protection and pres-
ervation of the marine environment." The developed maritime nations
have argued that the coastal state should only be able to adopt internation-
ally agreed standards of pollution control on the basis that the imposition of
varying unilateral standards, especially in relation to the design, manning
and construction of vessels, will interfere with the freedom of navigation,
with a consequent reduction in world trade.33 At the other extreme the
developing coastal states were of the view that they should be allowed to
enact any type of national standards in the economic zone if, in their view,
the existing international safeguards were inadequate.34 It was considered
that only then could those countries be sure that their economic interests in
the zone were protected when international standards might be slow to
change in response to newly discovered sources of ecological disturbance.
Many of the countries in the southwest Pacific adopted a position which
approximated more closely the extreme position of the developing coastal
states. New Zealand and Fiji, among other nations, tabled a proposal
"See the resolution in 36 AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES (1977), at 4. The member states were
Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Nauru, Tonga, Western Samoa, Cook Islands,
Niue, Gilbert Islands, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu.
"See, especially, Sir Robert Jackling on behalf of the U.K. delegation, OFFICIAL RECORDS,
supra note 7, Vol. II, at 200, 77; also U.S.S.R., at 320, 57; Greece, at 327, 51; and Italy, at
325, 31.
'"See the Kenyan draft articles for the preservation and protection of the marine environ-
ment to be found in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, vol. III, at 245, article 26.
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which allowed for the unilateral introduction of design and construction
requirements without approval by any independent authority, "where such
stricter standards are rendered essential by exceptional hazards to naviga-
tion or the special vulnerability of the marine environment. ' 35 Australia,
on the other hand, saw itself as adopting a compromise approach. After the
fourth session of the conference the Australian delegation puts its position
in these terms:
Australia is seeking to achieve a regime for protecting the marine environment
which will, on the one hand provide sufficient powers to protect the waters of an
EEZ and territorial sea, and on the other hand will guarantee to the international
community adequate freedoms and rights of navigation. Any rights that are
acquired by Australia to control foreign ships in Australian offshore waters will
also be acquired by about 120 other coastal States in respect of their offshore
waters. It is important for Australia that these rights should not result in unrea-
sonable interference with international shipping upon which Australian overseas
trade depends.36
The implementation of this policy led the Australian delegation to support
the introduction of unilateral measure by the coastal state with the qualifi-
cation that "unilateral action must be reasonable in the circumstances and
its reasonableness should be appealable to a disputes settlement machin-
ery."'37 In Australia's view the protection of the Barrier Reef necessitated
unilateral regulations governing traffic separation schemes, the discharge of
pollutants, compulsory pilotage, and under keel clearances. 38
The result of the Draft Convention is very much in line with the Austra-
lian position rather than the positions of the smaller countries in the region.
Article 211(6) allows a coastal state in a special zone of ecological hazard to
introduce domestic regulations (not accepted internationally) for the protec-
tion of the marine environment provided they do not relate to the design,
construction, equipment requirements, and manning of foreign vessels.
However, the international organization, within twelve months of notifica-
tion by the coastal state, must determine that the area in which the unilat-
eral requirements are to be imposed justifies the introduction of such
special measures, and then approve those special measures themselves.
This proposal has been declared "acceptable" to the Australian delegation
although the ban on manning and design requirements might prevent the
Australian government introducing rules regarding compulsory pilotage.
Apart from the question of the introduction of unilateral regulations, a
second issue regarding the protection of the marine environment in the eco-
nomic zone was the interrelationship of the enforcement powers of the
35Canada, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Ireland, India, Iran, New Zealand, Philippines and Spain:
draft articles on a general approach to the preservation of the marine environment appearing
in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. III, at 249, article 7(3)(iii).
36Fourth Australian Delegation Report, at 46-47.
3Statement in Third Committee on July 15, 1974, by the Australian representative, Mr. J.
Petherbridge, appearing in Second Australian Delegation Report (Annex F).
3"Fifth Australian Delegation Report, at 28.
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coastal state, flag state, and port state. The Australian delegation, again
adopting a midway position, supported the right of the port state to under-
take investigations and legal proceedings against a vessel which happens to
be in one of its ports for pollution offenses outside the waters of the port
state and resisted attempts to exclude port-state enforcement except at the
request of the flag state. 39 It also supported the right of the coastal state to
bring proceedings against vessels for offenses in its economic zone but, in
accordance with its "compromise" position, objected to suggested changes
in earlier texts put before the conference allowing for detention and arrest
of foreign vessels,4 0 and giving the right of physical inspection of vessels
where there have been no actual discharge of pollutants but merely a
breach of applicable international rules resulting in threat of discharge.
4
'
New Zealand and the smaller island states of the region were, however, in
favor of increasing the coastal states' powers in this way.
42
The Draft Convention overrides the first of the Australian delegation's
objections by incorporating in article 220(6) a right of detention where there
has been a breach of applicable international rules which result in a dis-
charge causing major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or
related interests of the state. As to the second, Australia's position is met to
a degree in that article 220(5) only allows for physical inspection of a vessel
navigating in the economic zone where there has been a "substantial dis-
charge of pollutants." Yet the substantial discharge need not result in
actual, significant pollution of the marine environment, but only in the
threat of such pollution. The Draft Convention also incorporates a change
made after the seventh session of the conference which allows a coastal
state to take steps to protect its coastline and fishing interests when a mari-
time casualty which may "reasonably be expected to result in major harm-
ful consequences has occurred. ' ' 43 This replaced an earlier requirement
that the maritime casualty must result in a "grave and imminent danger
from pollution or threat of pollution." 44
These provisions go beyond Australia's preferred position.45 Undoubt-
edly, the perceived danger is that the wider powers might have the effect of
hampering freedom of navigation, especially in view of the large amount of
seas which will be brought within the 200-mile zone in the Pacific area.
Nevertheless Australia will accept all these provisions. 46 It is likely that
39Fifth Australian Delegation Report, at 29.; Sixth Australian Delegation Report, at 60.
'°Fourth Australian Delegation Report, at 45.
4'Sixth Australian Delegation Report, at 61.
2See the views of Western Samoa, Tonga, Indonesia, and Fiji, supra notes 7-10; also New
Zealand, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. IX, at 164, 80.
"Article 221 of the Draft Convention.
"Article 222 of the Revised Single Negotiating Text, May 6, 1976, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/
WP.8/Rev. I/Pt. 11.
4OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. IX, at 164, 73. Mr. McKeown, on behalf of the
Australian delegation indicated that the changes eventually incorporated in the Draft Conven-
tion "went beyond his country's position," but "he would accept even these."
'"id.
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New Zealand and the other Pacific island states will do the same, although
New Zealand is on record at the close of the seventh session of the confer-
ence as welcoming further changes in the jurisdiction and enforcement
powers of the coastal state.
47
IV. Scientific Research
The critical issue with regard to scientific research has been whether it is
necessary for countries or scientific bodies to seek the consent of the coastal
state before undertaking research in that state's economic zone. The devel-
oped nations, led by the United States, adopted a view that it would be an
unwarranted restriction of the high seas to impose any necessity for the
coastal state to give its express consent.48 The developing coastal states
insisted vigorously on a consent requirement in order to protect themselves
from the possibility of research being directed against the resources of the
economic resources zone under the guise of purely scientific research.49
Of the countries in the southwest Pacific it was Australia who took the
most active involvement in the issue of scientific research. Australia's posi-
tion regarding scientific research was put by the Australian Delegation in
these terms:
Australia has two main concerns regarding marine scientific research which are
somewhat competing. The first is that Australia supports the concept that marine
scientific research should be vigorously encouraged and that it should be as free
as possible from restrictions. The second is that Australia is concerned that the
coastal State should have adequate powers to control and regulate activities
within its EEZ with respect to resources and also to enable it to preserve and to
protect its marine environment. These two concerns have led Australia to adopt
a moderate position which has enabled the Delegation to assist in bringing
together those delegations which hold extreme views. 50
In line with this "moderate" approach Australia at the close of the fifth
session of the conference submitted what it regarded as a compromise
formula, taking the form of a new article 60 of the Revised Single Negotiat-
ing Text.
1. Marine scientific research activities in the economic zone or on the continen-
tal shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention, provided that coastal State shall not deny
its consent to a marine scientific research project unless that project:
(a) bears substantially upon the exploration and exploitation of the living or
non-living resources;
47Mr. MacKay, on behalf of New Zealand, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. IX, at
164, 80.
"See the views of the American delegation, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. II, at
341, $ 11-12. U.S.S.R., at 349, 15.
"As an example see Colombia, Draft Articles on Marine Scientific Research, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 62/C. 3/L. 13. See the views of Indonesia, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. II, at
207, 68; also Venezuela, at 200, $ 46; Peru, at 345, 1 59; India, at 352, 63; Kenya, at 350,
29.
'
0Fourth Australian Delegation Report, at 50.
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(b) involves drilling or the use of explosives on the continental shelf; or
(c) involves the construction, operation or use of such artificial islands, instal-
lations and structures as are referred to in Article 48 of Part II of this
Convention.
2. Marine scientific research activities in the economic zone or on the continen-
tal shelf shall not unduly interfere with economic activities performed by the
coastal States in accordance with its jurisdiction as provided for in this
Convention. 5'
The difficulty with this submission was that it differed little from the word-
ing of the previous article 60, and it attracted the same criticisms. The
major objection of the coastal states was that the general principle of the
"consent" regime established at the beginning of the first paragraph of the
article was eroded by the qualifications expressed in the second part
((l)(a)(b)(c)), which delineated the only circumstances in which the coastal
state can refuse consent and which make it plain that consent to a research
project should be the general rule. In the words of the Peruvian delegation
it "contained no positive element and therefore did not merit any com-
ment."' 52 In the southwest Pacific, New Zealand supported the Australian
proposal, considering its interests "well protected"5 3 under the formulation.
The reaction of the smaller island states in the area is not recorded, but
earlier statements at the conference would tend to indicate that they would
be likely to oppose it, preferring the view of the developing coastal states.
54
Although the text put forward by the Australian delegation was only a sub-
mission aimed at achieving a consensus, it is apparent that it was also Aus-
tralia's preferred position. 55 On this issue, Australia can be regarded as
aligning itself with the major researching states.
The formula adopted in the Draft Convention is a rejection of the view of
the researching states and is a negotiating victory for the developing coastal
states. The only country disappointed with this outcome in the southwest
Pacific would be Australia. Article 246 states the general principle that the
consent of the coastal state is needed for research (article 246(3)), and then
enumerates the circumstances for which the coastal state may refuse con-
sent (e.g., that the project is of direct significance for the exploration or
exploitation of natural resources), 56 but does not enumerate those circum-
"Fifth Australian Delegation Report, Annex I.
"OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. VI, at 93, 30.
3OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. VI, at 99-100, 73. Note the support given to the
Australian proposal by the United States, at 101; Italy, at 101; Ireland, at 101; Denmark, at 99;
U.K., at 93.
5
"See generally the speeches cited in supra notes 7-10.
"See OFFICLL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. IX, at 164, 164.
"°The circumstances for which consent can be refused are that the research:
(a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources,
whether living or non-living;
(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of
harmful substances into the marine environment;
(c) involves the construction, operation of use of artificial islands, installations and struc-
tures referred to in articles 60 and 80;
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stances exclusively. There is a requirement that research shall be "exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes"-a term that is undefined and is presumably
left to the interpretation of the coastal state-and there is no obligation on
the coastal state to give written answers for its refusal. Most importantly,
the question of whether consent should be refused is left entirely in the
hands of the coastal state, with no objective basis (by a dispute settlement
procedure or otherwise) for deciding whether the refusal is justified on the
grounds that it is in some way of direct significance for the economic
exploitation of the state's economic zone. 57
V. Islands
The question regarding the economic zones of islands was one which had
special importance for the Pacific. It was argued by a number of states that
the question of whether a particular island should have an economic zone
of its own should be dependent on such factors as population and geologi-
cal structure and that, in any case, island dependencies should not be
allowed to possess an economic zone of their own.5 8 A joint submission by
Fiji, New Zealand, Tonga, and Western Samoa vigorously rejected these
propositions. According to this proposal any island which is a "naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide" 59 should be able to establish an economic zone. If the island was one
which had not attained full independence then the resources were to be
vested "in the inhabitants of that territory" 60 rather than in the colonial
power. Australia supported these proposals, 6 1 and they became incorpo-
rated in the Draft Convention with the qualification that "rocks which can-
not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" 62 shall have no
economic zone. This definition will enable Australia to claim an economic
zone around the Cocos and Christmas Islands to the northwest and Norfolk
and Lord Howe Islands to the east. New Zealand may extend its economic
resources zone to the southeast as a result of the geographical situation of
Campbell Island, the Auckland Islands, and the Antipodes Islands. The
articles will also mean that the other island states of the southwest Pacific
including those (such as New Caledonia) which have not yet achieved inde-
(d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 regarding the nature and
objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if the researching State or competent
international organisation has outstanding obligations to the coastal State from a prior
research project.
57There is a settlement procedure "with regard to marine scientific research" (Article
297(2)(a)), but excluded from its ambit is any dispute arising out of "the exercise by the coastal
state of a right or discretion in accordance with Article 246" (Article 297(2)(a)(ii)) of the Draft
Convention).
"See, e.g., Madagascar, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. II at 174, 51.
5 Draft Articles on Islands and on territories under foreign domination or control, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 30, Article 1.
601d., Part B.
.
6 Sixth Australian Delegation Report, at 46.62Article 121 (3) of the Draft Convention.
The Economic Resources Zone
pendence, will also be able to claim economic zones with the resulting dimi-
nution of the area of the high seas and possible interferences to navigation.
VI. Continental Shelf
One of the problems facing the Law of the Sea Conference has been the
relationship between the economic zone and the continental shelf. Austra-
lia, possessing a large continental margin, has the greatest interest in this
issue. It has always supported the existing regime that applies to the conti-
nental shelf,63 a view which is implemented in article 76 of the Draft Con-
vention. A significant modification to the Australian proposal, however,
lies in the adoption of a revenue sharing system in the resources of the
continental margin in cases in which the margin happens to extend beyond
the 200-mile limit.64 It is envisaged that payments will be made through
the Seabed Authority to be distributed "on an equitable sharing criteria,"
taking into account the interests and needs of the developing states, particu-
larly the least developed and landlocked among them. Australia has always
been an opponent of these provisions on the basis that "there is no reason in
equity why a coastal state should be deprived of an area over which it has
existing rights [under the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf]
while the area under the jurisdiction of other states is being maintained or
even extended."165 The issue is an important one for Australia because of
the large deposits of natural gas in the northwest shelf field and the impor-
tant possible future sources of oil in the Exmouth plateau field off the coast
of Port Headland. 66 Some of the resources in both these areas are located
on the continental shelf but beyond the 200-mile limit. The incorporation
of the resource-sharing provisions does represent a defeat for Australian
interests, but it was a trend that was inevitable given the need to find a
compromise between those nations with large continental margins and
those countries, especially the coastal African states, who do not possess the
same geographical advantages and who were arguing strongly that the con-
tinental shelf should no longer be a factor at all in determining state control
over resources of the seabed.67
VII. Conclusion
In general, the provisions of the Draft Convention regarding the exclu-
sive economic zone can be considered to be of significant benefit to the
"See statement by Mr. Harry in the Second Committee. Second Australian Delegation
Report, Annex D.
-Article 82 of the Draft Convention.
"Statement by Mr. Harry in the Second Committee. Second Australian Delegation Report,
Annex D.
'See Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia, Antarctica and the Law of
the Sea, PARLIAMENTARY PAPER 198/1978, at 51-52.
"See the views of Madagascar, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, Vol. II at 174, 48; Zaire,
at 176, $ 78; Liberia, at 184, 23.
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nations of the southwest Pacific. The articles regarding fisheries give the
coastal state wide discretion in granting access to other nations, a result that
is in line with the negotiating stands of all these countries. The same can be
said for the provisions regarding scientific research in regard to all these
countries apart from Australia, which would have preferred a view akin to
that of the major researching states. In relation to the protection of the
marine environment, on the other hand, the final result is more in accord-
ance with Australia's views, especially as to the unilateral introduction of
special regulations. New Zealand and the smaller island states indicated
that they would have favored a greater degree of latitude allowed to the
coastal state in imposing their own regulations. Overall there is no doubt
that the implementation of the 200-mile zone in the terms of the Draft
Treaty will benefit the nations of the southwest Pacific to a greater extent
than other nations. About thirty countries, including these nations, which
represent less than one-third of the countries of the world will benefit con-
siderably from its introduction. Another twenty-nine landlocked and geo-
graphically disadvantaged states, as well as another eighty coastal states,
will gain comparatively little from the economic zone.
